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Abstract. The conclusions drawn from a dialogue depend both on the content
of the arguments, and the level of trust placed in the arguments and the entity
advancing them. In this paper, we describe a framework for dialogue where such
trust forms the basis for expressing preferences between arguments, and in turn,
for computing conclusions of the dialogue. Our framework contains object and
meta-level arguments, and uses ASPIC+ to represent arguments, while argument
schemes capture meta-level arguments about trust and preferences.
1 Introduction
In human dialogue, conclusions are drawn not only based on argument interactions, but
also by considering the level of trust or confidence placed in the arguments and those
presenting them. Critically, as the dialogue progresses, additional utterances can cause
these levels of trust to change, and capturing such changes is therefore important.
Since we consider the arguments advanced during the dialogue, as well as argument
about those arguments, our approach builds on Muller’s meta-argumentation system [7].
Here, object-level arguments are advanced which deal with the topic of the dialogue.
Meta-level arguments then describe arguments about arguments, including whether an
argument attacks another; what counts as an argument; and whether an argument is pre-
ferred over another. Our focus in this paper involves arguments which relate to trust be-
tween arguments, and we consider several such classes of argument, described through
argumentation schemes. As the dialogue progresses, arguments attacking and support-
ing these arguments can be introduced, causing shifts in trust over time, in contrast to
systems such as [2, 3, 11], where preferences and trust in arguments are fixed.
Our work combines several existing frameworks and techniques, and in the next sec-
tion, we provide the background necessary to our approach. In Section 3, we introduce
our dialogue model and the argument schemes used within our meta-argumentation
framework. Section 4 discusses an example of our work and we conclude in Section 5.
2 Background
Our work builds on a fragment of ASPIC+ [6], which uses abstract argumentation [4]
to identify justified conclusions. We therefore begin by briefly discussing these.
Definition 1. An argument framework (AF) is a pair 〈A,D〉 where A is a set of argu-
ments and D ⊆ A×A is a binary defeat relation. Given AF = 〈A,D〉, and E ⊆ A,
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– E is conflict-free iff there are no φ1, φ2 ∈ E s.t. (φ1, φ2) ∈ D.
– E defends φ1 iff for every (φ2, φ1) ∈ D, there exist a φ3 ∈ E s.t. (φ3, φ2) ∈ D.
– E is an admissible set iff E is conflict free and defends all its elements.
– E is a complete extension iff there are no other elements which it defends.
– E is a preferred extension iff it is a maximal complete extension.
An extension identifies a consistent set of arguments and conclusions. While many
different classes of extensions have been defined, we focus on preferred extensions
here. It should be noted that an AF can have multiple different preferred extensions. An
argument present in all extensions is sceptically justified; if it is present in at least one
extension, it is credulously justified.
AFs as described above are abstract and lack structure. Given a knowledge base, we
must be able to determine which arguments can be constructed, and for this purpose,
we make use of a fragment the popular ASPIC+ framework [6]. ASPIC+ defines an
argumentation system built from an (unspecified) logical language L which is closed
under negation (¬). Arguments are then formed by repeatedly applying strict (elements
of Rs) or defeasible (Rd) inference rules to elements from a knowledge baseK. The ar-
gumentation system contains a function n : Rd → K, associating defeasible rules with
entities in the knowledge base. Arguments in ASPIC+ attack each other when incon-
sistencies exist between them. ASPIC+ describes how preferences between arguments
can be obtained from preferences between rules and elements in the knowledge base
determining successful attacks; i.e. defeats. The resultant structure is referred to as an
argumentation theory, corresponding to an argumentation framework as per Definition
1. In our approach, we consider only defeasible rules, no preferences, and assume that
all elements in a knowledge base can be attacked.
Definition 2. (Argument and Attack) [6]. An argument A on the basis of a knowledge
base K in argumentation system (L,¬,Rd, n) is
1. µ if µ ∈ K with: Prem(A) = {µ}, Conc(A) = {µ}, Sub(A) = {µ}.
2. A1, . . . , An → /⇒ ψ ifA1, . . . , An are arguments such that there exists a a defea-
sible rule Conc(A1 ), . . . ,Conc(An) ⇒ ψ in Rd with Prem(A) = Prem(A1 ) ∪
. . . ∪ Prem(An), Conc(A) = {µ}, Sub(A) = Sub(A1 ) ∪ . . . ∪ Sub(An) ∪ {A}.
3. A attacksB iffA undercuts, rebuts or underminesB, whereA undercutsB (onB′)
iff Conc(A) = ¬n(r) for some B′ ∈ Sub(B). A rebuts B (on B′) iff Conc(A) =
¬µ for some B′ ∈ Sub(B) of the form B′′1 , . . . , B′′n ⇒ µ. A undermines B (on µ)
iff Conc(A) = ¬µ for a premise µ of B for an ordinary premise µ of B.
3 Hierarchical Systems of Arguments and Dialogues
Our approach uses meta-level arguments about trust. These refer to object-level argu-
ments about the original dialogue topic. We build on the ideas of Wooldridge [14], who
suggested that arguments and dialogue are inherently meta-logical processes. Thus, ar-
guments advanced in a dialogue are not restricted to asserting the truth or falsity of
statements, but include arguments about arguments; taking a hierarchical view, argu-
ments at level n of the hierarchy may refer to the same or lower levels in the hierarchy.
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In our work, we consider a hierarchy with 3 levels, labelled l0, . . . l2. The object level
(l0) contains arguments and attacks related to the domain of discourse. Arguments at
level l1 support arguments at the object level and indirectly attack them by attacking
other arguments within l1. These capture the trust placed in object level arguments and
attacks. Similarly, arguments at l2 attack others in this level, as well as at level l1, and
capture trust in sources of object-level arguments. All of these arguments and the inter-
actions between them are encoded in a bimodal argument graph.
3.1 Bimodal Argument Graphs
A bimodal argument graph is a hierarchical structure capturing object and meta-level
arguments, and the attacks and supports between them.
Definition 3. A Bimodal Argument Graph for a reasoner AgI is a tuple BAGI =
〈AO,AMI ,DO,DMI ,SMOI ,SMAI 〉 where
– AO and AMI are object-level and meta-level arguments respectively such that
AO ∩ AMI = ∅.
– DO ⊆ AO ×AO and DMI ⊆ AMI ×AMI are defeat relations for the object and
meta-levels respectively.
– SMOI ⊆ AMI × AO, is a support relation from meta-level to object-level argu-
ments.
– SMAI ⊆ AMI ×RO, is a support relation from meta-level to object-level attacks.
Bimodal argument graphs constrain arguments, requiring that for all φ ∈ AO and
(a, b) ∈ RO there exists a β, γ ∈ AMI such that (β, φ) ∈ SMOI and (γ, (a, b)) ∈
SMAI . If (β, φ) ∈ SMOI , then β is said to support φ.
Extensions within a bimodal argument graph (according to some semantics) are
computed from the highest meta-level down to the object level. More specifically, the
extension of the highest level is computed, and the subset of arguments at the next level
down supported by arguments within the extension are used to form a sub-framework
over which extensions are again computed. This process repeats itself until an extension
at the object level can be computed.
3.2 The Object Level (l0)
Our focus revolves around arguments obtained from a dialogue — a sequence of moves
D = [M1, . . . ,Mx]. We do not specify the protocol used to create this dialogue, but
assume that each participant has a commitment store representing those arguments they
are publicly committed to. Arguments can be added or retracted from each participant’s
commitment store. Furthermore, we assume that a participant is only committed to
arguments that they have introduced. We denote the commitment store of participant
Ag i as CSAgi , and call ∪AgiCSAgi the universal commitment store, UCS. The UCS
corresponds to the set of arguments at the object levelAO in Def. 3. Both the individual
and universal commitment stores are updated at each move of the dialogue.
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Property Definition
defeats(a, b) argument a defeats argument b (i.e., a, b ∈ A and (a, b) ∈ D)
unattacked(a) argument a is unattacked (i.e., a ∈ A and (b, a) /∈ D)
preferred(a, b)
argument a is preferred to argument b (i.e., a, b ∈ A, (a, b) ∨ (b, a) ∈ D
and a defeats b via meta-level arguments.
unattacked(a, b) defeat(a, b) is unattacked (i.e., a, b ∈ A, (a, b) ∈ D and (c, a) /∈ D)
defended(a, b)
defeat(a, b) is defended (i.e.,
a, b, c, d ∈ A, (a, b) ∈ D, (c, a) ∈ D and there is (d, c) ∈ D )
conflict free(CSAgi )
the commitment store CSAgi is conflict-free (i.e., there exist no
φ1, φ2 ∈ CSAgi such that (φ1, φ2) ∈ D)
retracted(a,CSAgi )
argument a is retracted from CSAgi (i.e., CSAgi = CSAgi ∪ b
and (b, a) ∈ D )
Table 1: Predicates for Trust Properties
After introducing an argument at the object level, additional arguments are added to
the meta-levels monotonically. Let ϕ(·) indicate that an element should be trusted. At
the meta-levels, every argument a ∈ AO is supported by an argument α asserting that
a should be trusted (ϕ(a)), every defeat (a, b) ∈ DO should also be trusted (ϕ(a, b)),
and that utterances by an agent Agi should be trusted (ϕ(Agi)). Additional arguments
are instantiated via trust-related argument schemes.
We map arguments and attacks in our hierarchical system to arguments and defeats
in a bimodal argument graph [7] by stating that argument a defeats argument b iff a
attacks b and there are some meta-arguments α, β such that α supports a and β supports
b and α attacks β. Properties of the argument framework at the object level is encoded
using a fragment of ASPIC+. We assume that L is a predicate-based language with a
finite number of constant symbols, and which can therefore (formally) be mapped to a
propositional language.
Agents build meta-arguments about object-level arguments, attacks, and sources of
argument by applying a set of defeasible rules which we define as argument schemes
(and critical questions). At the meta-level, we do not consider preferences between
arguments, meaning that attacks and defeats are equivalent here.
3.3 The First Meta-level (l1)
The first meta-level contains facts and associated rules from which arguments can be
formed regarding the object level arguments. Table 1 summarises the predicates which
can appear at the meta-level, and describes the condition under which these are added.
As individual utterances are made within the dialogue, additional predicates and argu-
ments are monotonically added to the meta-level. The arguments are obtained from a set
of trust specific argument schemes. These schemes describe inference rules from which
arguments can be created, as well as critical questions which allow attacks against the
arguments to occur. We detail these schemes in the remainder of this section3.
3 Due to lack of space, we formalise only some of the schemes and critical questions.
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Argument from Lack of Justification (ArgLJ ) If a dialogue participant cannot justify
their arguments, then these arguments should not be trusted. More formally, if a is in
Agi’s commitment store, and b (in the universal commitment store) defeats a, then a is
not (skeptically) justified. In turn, this means that the argument and dialogue participant
should not be trusted. Formally, we have the following defeasible inferences.
rSLJ : a ∈ CSAgi , b ∈ UCS , defeats(b, a)⇒ ¬ϕ(a)/¬ϕAgi
A defeater to b serves as a critical question to prevent the application of the scheme.
rCQLJ : ∃c ∈ UCS , defeats(c, b)⇒ ϕ(a)/ϕ(Agi)
Argument from Void Precedence (ArgV P ) This scheme is adapted from the void prece-
dence property of ranking based semantics [1], and states that a non-attacked argument
is accepted, and should therefore be considered trusted. We omit its formalisation due
triviality and lack of space.
Argument from Defence Precedence (ArgDP ) This scheme is also adapted from rank-
ing based semantics [1], and states that an argument defended against its attackers by
more preferred argument(s) should be trusted.
rSDP : a, b, c ∈ UCS , defeats(b, a), defeats(c, b)⇒ ϕ(a)
At the same time, d defeating c would undercut this scheme, and serves as a critical
question (not formalised due to space constraints).
Argument from Preference Precedence (ArgPP ) This scheme specifies how attacks
between conflicting object-level arguments are resolved with preferences. In effect, an
(otherwise defeated) argument which is preferred remains trusted as long as it is justi-
fied. Again, another defeater of the argument would render this scheme invalid.
rSPP : a, b ∈ UCS , defeats(a, b), preferred(b, a)⇒ ϕ(b)
Trust can be placed not only in arguments and speakers, but also in defeats. If we have
{(a, b), (c, a)} ⊆ D, then (c, a) attacks (a, b). An argument (d, c) would defend (a, b)
in this case. A defeat is then trusted if it is unattacked, defended, or originates from
a justified argument, and is untrusted otherwise. This intuition is also captured in ex-
tended argument frameworks with second (or higher) order attacks [5]. It should be
noted that a defeat may be trusted when both arguments it refers to are untrusted. Ar-
gument schemes for reasoning about trust in defeats are defined as follows.
Argument from Justified Defeat (ArgJD) A defeat is trusted if it originates from a
justified argument.
rSJD = a, b ∈ UCS , defeats(a, b)⇒ ϕ(a, b)
As elsewhere, the presence of a defeater of a serves to undercut this scheme.
rCQJD : c ∈ UCS , defeats(c, a)⇒ ¬ϕ(a, b)
6 Gideon Ogunniye et al.
Argument from Unattacked Defeat (ArgUD) A defeat is trusted if it is unattacked.
Argument from Defended Defeat (ArgDD) A defeat is trusted if it is defended. This
scheme is undercut if the defeat that the defender attacks is preferred to the defender.
3.4 The Second Meta-level (l2)
In this level we consider properties that can be inferred to establish meta-arguments
about trust in the sources of arguments at l0. These meta-arguments indirectly attack
or support arguments at level l0 by attacking or supporting arguments at level l1. For
example, the assertion ¬ϕ(Agi) (i.e., the source Agi of an argument a should not be
trusted), attacks all meta-arguments at level l1 which support arguments advanced by
Agi at level l0. Argument schemes here include the following.
Argument from Self Contradiction (ArgSC) This scheme is adapted from Walton’s
argument from inconsistent commitment [12], and states that an agent committed to
two arguments which attack each other should not be trusted.
rSSC : a, b ∈ CSAgi , defeats(a, b) ∨ defeats(b, a)⇒ ¬ϕ(Agi)
A closely related argument scheme is Argument from Consistency (ArgCN ) stating that
if all an agent’s commitments are conflict free, then the agent should be trusted.
Argument from Retraction (ArgRN ) Retracting a commitment results in a loss of trust.
When performing such a retraction, some premises or warrants are also typically re-
tracted [13]. This means that a retraction should cause trust to be lost not only for the
retraction itself, but also for other arguments which are defended by the retracted argu-
ment (unless these latter arguments are defended by other unretracted arguments). This
leads to the following scheme.
rSRN : a, b ∈ CSAgi , c ∈ UCS , defeats(c, a), defeats(b, c), retracted(b)⇒ ¬ϕ(Agi)
We have described how meta-arguments about trust at different levels can attack
each other and support lower level arguments. In our approach, each dialogue partici-
pant AgI has an associated BAGI , whose object level is built from the dialogue and
their commitment stores. Meta-levels components are constructed subjectively from a
private knowledge base of preferences and properties observed at the object level. The
maximal set of arguments appearing in the extensions of all participant’s BAGs is the
set of trusted arguments within the dialogue.
4 Example
Consider a long running dialogue between three agents (Ag1, Ag3, Ag3) about the death
penalty. At the object level, the following arguments are advanced.
– Ag1 : The death penalty is a legitimate form of punishment. (a)
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Fig. 1: Bimodal Graph for object and meta-level argumentation
– Ag2 : God does not want us to kill. (b)
– Ag3 : God does not exist. (c)
– Ag1 : Some people believe in God. (d)
– Ag2 : The state has no right to put its subjects to death. (e)
– Ag3 : The legal status of the death penalty should not depend on beliefs. (f)
– Ag1 : All religions should have a say over public law. (g)
– Ag2 : Majorities in some democratic countries favour death penalty .(h).
– Ag3 : Even if God exists, religion should stop at the door of the temple. (i)
Note that Ag2 has potentially contradicted themselves in arguments e and h. In-
stantiating ArgSC , we have an argument at the second meta-level for ¬ϕ(Ag2), which
attacks ϕ(e), ϕ(h) and any other arguments advanced byAg2 in the dialogue. While ar-
gument h is undefeated, and supports argument a, yielding ϕ(a) using ArgDP , the fact
that we had obtained ¬ϕ(Ag2) means that this support is attacked. Figure 1 provides
the full bimodal argument graph obtained from this dialogue, where meta-arguments
are represented by their conclusions.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper presents an approach for reasoning about trust in dialogues that combines
three of the most popular mechanisms used within computational modelling of argu-
mentation: ASPIC+ [10], argument schemes [12] and meta-argumentation [7, 11].
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Unlike the systems described in [2, 3] where preferences are given and fixed, our
argument scheme based approach models how trust can be used as a rational basis
for expressing preferences between arguments, determining successive attacks and for
computing extensions. The systems in [8, 11] compute argument acceptability on the
basis of the trustworthiness of their sources and the feedback that the final quality of
arguments provide on the source evaluation. Unlike our approach, these approaches do
not consider how trust in arguments and their sources change dynamically within a di-
alogue. Also the work presented in [9] has considered different argument schemes for
reasoning about trust in an individual. However, these rely on extra-dialogical proper-
ties, while our focus is on how utterances affect trust during a dialogue.
We are pursuing several avenues of future work. First, we seek to link our system
with graded and numerical semantics. Second, we recognise that the argument schemes
we describe are not exhaustive, and believe that additional argument schemes for trust
can be identified. Finally, we must demonstrate that the manner in which our system
computes trust is consistent with human intuitions, and that it satisfies certain desirable
properties. If divergences between these exists, then the framework could serve as a
useful foundation for describing and studying paradoxes in human-based trust.
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